The left half of the laminated picture depicted a row of headshots of the four in-group group members, below which were images of marshmallows: on the left was an image of one marshmallow (representing the immediate reward) and on the right was an image of two marshmallows (representing the delayed reward). Consistent with the in-group waiting for the larger reward, an arrow pointed from the in-group to the two marshmallows. The right half of the laminated picture depicted the four out-group members above the same marshmallow images but with an arrow pointing to the single marshmallow instead of the two marshmallows, consistent with the out-group not waiting for the larger reward.
In the in-group-didn't-wait condition, the laminated picture was identical except that the arrows pointing to the marshmallows were consistent with the in-group not waiting for the larger reward and the out-group waiting for the larger reward. The experimenter said, "Look! These kids are in the green group too, just like you! And guess what? They didn't wait until they could have two marshmallows. And these kids are in the orange group and they waited until they could have two marshmallows."
In the control condition, the laminated picture depicted the in-group and the out-group in the same manner, but did not depict the marshmallows and thus provided no information about the groups' delay behavior. The experimenter said, "Look! These kids are in the green group too, just like you! And these kids are in the orange group." We opted not to include a statement about the in-group receiving a choice between waiting and having two marshmallows because we anticipated doing so could induce children to speculate about their group's behavior, potentially influencing children's wait times.
Memory for group's behavior. The experimenter then asked the child, "So what did the green group do?" If the child said they did not know or provided an otherwise uninformative answer, the experimenter asked, "Did they wait or not wait?" If the child responded correctly, the experimenter said, "Yes that's right they waited until they could have two marshmallows." If the child responded incorrectly the experimenter said, "Actually, they waited until they could have two marshmallows." In the control condition, this question was omitted.
Marshmallow test. The experimenter said, "Okay, I'm going to go get more marshmallows from the other room. I'll leave this marshmallow here for you to eat if you want to while I'm gone, and if you haven't eaten any of it when I come back, you can have two marshmallows instead." At this point the experimenter left the room and went to the adjacent room to watch the child via webcam. The session was stopped after the child took a bite or lick of the marshmallow, or waited the full 15 minutes. At this point the experimenter returned to the room and said, "Okay all done with snack time!" and gave children the second marshmallow if they waited the full fifteen minutes. The experimenter then proceeded with the post-test questions. The session was discontinued if children became distressed or left the room.
Second memory for group question. This memory check was identical to the first with the exception that no feedback was provided.
Second group identification question. The experimenter laid out the pictures of the two groups and asked the child, "Which kids are nicer?" A verbal or point response was recorded.
Coding of wait time from videos. A naïve coder who was blind to the experimental condition and study hypotheses recorded when each child's first lick or bite of the marshmallow occurred (as in Kidd et al., 2013; Michaelson & Munakata, 2015) . To ensure reliability, the coding was checked against that of a second naïve coder, r(86) = .98, p < .001. Coders differed by less than 3 seconds on 94% of judgments. The five cases in which the coding discrepancy was larger than 3 seconds were discussed and resolved by the coders.
Coding of self-talk from videos. A research assistant who was blind to the experimental condition and study hypotheses transcribed all videos. A naïve coder recorded whether children made any reference to the in-and out-groups (green and orange, respectively) while waiting.
Coding was checked against that of a second naïve coder and there were no discrepancies.
Analytic Approach
The study design and analytic plan were preregistered with the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/fwt65). Our preregistered hypothesis was that children whose group waited for two marshmallows would wait longer for two marshmallows than children whose group did not wait.
All analyses beyond the confirmatory test comparing the delay and no-delay conditions were exploratory. Our preregistered analytic plan was to conduct a confirmatory test of this hypothesis using linear regression; however, the dependent variable was heavily right-censored, rendering linear regression inappropriate as it would produce biased estimates and inflate the type II error rate (Mills, 2011) . Thus we abandoned the planned linear analysis in favor of the more appropriate survival analysis using Cox proportional hazards regression models, developed specifically to handle censored data (Cox, 1972) . All analyses were conducted using the R statistical package (R Development Core Team, 2006) and the lme4 add-on package to implement mixed-effects models (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, &Walker, 2015) . No data were excluded. One session was terminated early during the delay period (at 9 min 51 sec) due to experimenter error (the experimenter mistakenly thought the child had tasted the marshmallow); however, because the data point was valid (i.e., the only difference from other censored data points is that censoring occurred earlier) it was retained and the delay time coded as censored.
Due to an equipment malfunction, video recordings of sessions were not available for two participants in the control group. One of these participants unambiguously waited the entire 15 minute period and the other participant ate the marshmallow 15 seconds after the experimenter left the room, as coded by the experimenter using the webcam and a timer. Excluding these participants from the sample did not affect the results.
Results
All children remembered which group they were in, both before and after the marshmallow test. Children also identified with their group: 80% of children chose to give a sticker to their group instead of the out-group prior to learning anything about their group's behavior, and, after the marshmallow test, 81% indicated that their group was nicer. These rates were well above chance, ts > 7, ps < .001. Almost all children remembered, both prior to and following the marshmallow test, whether their group waited or did not wait: M pre-test = 94 % (51 of 54; 6 children were not asked this question due to experimenter error), SD pre-test = 23%, t(53) = 14.13, p < .001; M post-test = 90 % (54 of 60), SD post-test = 30%, t(59) = 10.24, p < .001.
The results of our confirmatory test were consistent with our preregistered hypothesis, although they did not meet the traditional .05 alpha threshold. Children whose group waited for two marshmallows had nearly twice the odds of resisting the marshmallow (Median wait time = 15.00 min) of children whose group did not wait (Median = 9.48 min), hazard ratio = 1.95, X 2(1)= 3.39, p = .07, 95% CI = [0.94, 4.01].
We also conducted an exploratory analysis with age included as a covariate because age tends to correlate with self-control ability; in this model, the greater likelihood of resisting the marshmallow for children whose group waited was significant, X 2 (1)= 4.19, p = .041, hazard ratio = 2.13, 95% CI = [1.02, 4.43]. The effect of age was not statistically significant (p = .1277).
Exploratory comparisons with the control condition suggest that group behavior influenced children to wait longer, but did not influence children to wait less. Children whose in-group waited were over two times more likely to resist the marshmallow compared to children who did not receive any information about their group's delay behavior (Median wait time = This pattern was further confirmed by children's verbalized reasons for waiting. Among the children in the in-group-waited condition, 24% of children (7 of 29; one additional child did not answer the question) cited the in-or out-group's behavior in their reason for waiting (e.g., "Because the green group waited", "Because I'm in the green group", "Orange didn't wait"). By contrast, 3% (1 of 29; one additional child did not answer the question) in the in-group-didn'twait condition cited in-or out-group behavior in their reason for not waiting, X 2 (1) < 3.62, p = .057. Similarly, among children who did not receive information about their group's behavior, 0% (0 of 29; one additional child was not asked the question due to experimenter error) cited the groups' behavior as their reason for waiting or not waiting, significantly less than in the ingroup-waited condition, X 2 (1) = 5.84, p = .016. The number of children who referred to the groups' behavior in the in-group-didn't-wait and control conditions did not differ,
Children's self-talk during the delay period was also consistent with our primary findings. Seventy-three percent of children engaged in some form of self-talk during the delay period and this did not vary by condition, p > .250. Children in all conditions talked about the green group (25%) and talked much less about the orange group (10%), X 2 (1) = 4.65, p = .031, consistent with in-group identification. The number of children who talked about the green group in the in-group-waited condition (40%) was higher than in the in-group-didn't-wait condition (17%), X 2 (1) = 4.02, p = .045, and marginally higher than in the control condition (18%) X 2 (1) = 3.43, p = .064. There was no significant difference between the no delay and control conditions, p > .250.
We also explored the possibility that children changed how they felt about their group after learning about their group's delay behavior, that is, that they were more biased in favor of their group upon learning their group did wait, and they were less biased in favor of their group upon learning their group did not wait. This would be consistent with children valuing waiting over not waiting at baseline. A mixed logistic regression (with random intercepts for subjects to account for dependency among observations) indicated the odds of children identifying with their group did not vary depending on whether they were asked before or after the marshmallow test, p > .250, or whether they were in the delay or no delay condition, p = .105, or the interaction of these factors, p = .105. Numerically, children in the in-group-waited condition show more of an in-group bias after learning about their group's behavior (M pre-test = 73%, M posttest = 90%), (whereas children in the in-group-didn't-wait condition showed the opposite pattern
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides the first evidence that group behavior influences self-control in children: children tended to wait longer when their in-group delayed gratification and their out- Alternatively, children may have been motivated to behave in accord with their group's behavior, without changing their thinking about whether or not delaying gratification is generally a good thing. In Experiment 2 we tested the possibility that group behavior influenced how children evaluate self-control.
While our in-group-waited manipulation induced children to wait longer, the in-group-didn'twait condition did not have a comparable negative effect on wait times. In addition, although not statistically significant, children's identification with their group numerically increased after the marshmallow test in the in-group-waited condition, and numerically decreased in the in-groupdidn't-wait condition. These patterns suggest children may value delaying but cannot always act accordingly. Learning that the in-group delayed and the out-group didn't may have supported delaying and increased in-group identification, whereas learning that the in-group did not delay and the out-group did may have led to dissonance between the valuing of delay behavior and ingroup identity, resulting in a reduction in in-group preference and no reduction in delaying. In Experiment 2, we added more questions to better test whether children's identification with their group changed after learning about their group's delay behavior.
Finally, in Experiment 2 we used shared preference as a basis for children's group membership (as in Billig & Tajfel, 1973) to increase group affiliation, which was expected to strengthen our manipulation by making children more likely to behave in accordance with their group.
Experiment 2
1 It is possible that our between subjects design was not sensitive enough to detect differences between the control and in-group-didn't-wait conditions. A pre-post design in which baseline delay is compared to post-test delay might be more sensitive and could be explored in future research, but would need to address the challenges inherent in having children complete the marshmallow test or a similar paradigm twice. one of the questions the experimenter noted this and omitted it from the remainder of the procedure.
Memory for group. As in Experiment 1, children were asked to indicate which group was their group. They were also asked to indicate which group was not their group. Correct responses were affirmed and incorrect responses were corrected.
Group identification (adapted from Dunham et al., 2011).
As in Experiment 1, children were asked questions to assess in-group identity, but in the current experiment four such questions were asked in each phase (i.e., pre-marshmallow test and post-test), in an effort to reduce measurement error and increase power to detect effects involving this variable. Children were asked questions such as, "Who should I give a sticker to?" and "Who helped their friend at school?"
Marshmallow test introduction. The marshmallow test was introduced in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Experimental manipulation. The wording of the experimental manipulation was adjusted to equate for length in descriptions of each group's behavior . In the in-group-waited condition, the experimenter said, "Look! These kids are in the green group, just like you! And guess what? They didn't have one marshmallow; they waited until they could have two marshmallows. And these kids are in the orange group, not your group! They had one marshmallow; they didn't wait until they could have two marshmallows." In the in-groupdidn't-wait condition, the experimenter said, "Look! These kids are in the green group, just like you! And guess what? They had one marshmallow; they didn't wait until they could have two marshmallows. And these kids are in the orange group, not your group! They didn't have one marshmallow; they waited until they could have two marshmallows." Memory for group behavior. Children were then asked to indicate what each group did.
If they failed to provide an informative response the experimenter said, "Did they wait or not wait?" Correct responses were affirmed and incorrect responses were corrected.
Marshmallow test.
The marshmallow test was administered as in Experiment 1. Once the child waited the full 15 minutes or tasted the marshmallow, the experimenter returned to the room and said, "Snack time is over! I just have a few more questions for you."
Post-test questions. Children were then asked several of the same questions they were asked in the pre-marshmallow-test phase: memory for group, memory for group behavior, and group identity. The only difference was that no feedback was provided following children's responses to any of the questions.
Evaluation of delay choice (adapted from Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010).
This procedure was added in Experiment 2 to test the hypothesis that group behavior influenced children via a change to how they evaluated delaying gratification. Children completed four trials in which they were presented with scenarios involving a pair of children who differed in their delay behavior. Each trial involved different rewards that were increasingly abstract from what they had experienced in the experiment (marshmallows, cookies, stickers, and money). They were shown a page with small pictures of two children of the same gender, one on the right side of the page and one on the left. These images were from the CAFE stimuli set hosted on Databrary (LoBue, 2014; LoBue & Thrasher, 2015) . Each depicted child had small pictures of rewards directly beneath them. A trial was introduced by the experimenter saying, for example, "Jenny and Kate love marshmallows! Their mom said they could have one marshmallow right away, or, if they waited until she found more marshmallows they could have two instead. Jenny ate one marshmallow right away. Kate waited until she could have two marshmallows." The experimenter then asked three questions aimed to tap children's implicit preference for one of the children. For example, children were asked "Who do you like more?", "Who is nicer?" and "Jenny loves playing Kazoop. It's her favorite game to play. Kate loves playing Babber. It's her favorite game to play. Now it's your turn. Would you rather play Kazoop like Jenny or Babber like Kate?" Novel words were used in the last question to ensure children were not influenced by their own preferences that were unrelated to the scenarios.
Coding of wait time from videos. Coding was conducted in the same manner as in Experiment 1. Similar to Experiment 1, the two coders ratings were highly correlated, r(86) = .99, p < .001. Coders differed by less than 3 seconds on 92% of judgments. The seven cases in which the coding discrepancy was larger than 3 seconds were discussed and resolved by the coders.
Analytic Approach
As in Experiment 1, the study design and analytic plan were preregistered with the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/7gszx). In our analytic plan we specified that we would use Cox regression models, as in Experiment 1, and linear regression to test our preregistered hypotheses, and that alternatives to regression would be used if any of the assumptions underlying assumptions were violated by the data. Specifically, to test whether condition influenced children's wait times, we planned to use Cox regression to compare models with condition (in-group-waited vs. in-group-didn't-wait) as the only predictor and compare it to a model without any predictors. To test whether condition influenced children's evaluation of delaying gratification, we planned to use linear regression to compare a model with condition (in-group-waited vs. in-group-didn't-wait) as the only predictor to a model without any predictors. To test whether in-group bias varied depending on condition, we planned to use multiple linear regression to compare a model including condition (in-group-waited vs. in-groupdidn't-wait), time (pre-vs. post marshmallow test) and their interaction, to a model excluding the interaction term, with the expectation that the model including the interaction term would be a better fit to the data.
Results
As in Experiment 1, all children remembered which group they were in with 100% accuracy. Children also identified with their group: M pre-test = 73 %, SD pre-test = 22%, t(86) = 9.6, p < .001; M post-test = 66 %, SD post-test = 26%, t(86) = 5.9, p < .001, and remembered both prior to and following the marshmallow task whether their group waited or did not wait: M pre-test = 92 % (78 of 85; 2 children were not asked this question due to experimenter error), SD pre-test = 28%, t (84 To test whether the influence of group behavior varied depending on children's tendency to identify with their group, we conducted an exploratory test in which in-group identity, condition, and their interaction were included in the model. The interaction was significant, hazard ratio = 8.02, X 2 (1)= 4.61, p < .03, 95% CI = [1. 2, 53.67] . Among children who tended to identify with their group (preferring the in-group on > 50% of the in-group identity questions, n = 63), the effect of condition was significant, Median in-group-waited = 15 min, Median in-group-didn't-wait = 3.3 min, hazard ratio = 3.28, X 2 (1)= 11.8, p < .001, 95% CI = [1. 6, 6.7] . Among children who did not show evidence of identifying with their group (preferring the in-group on 50% or fewer of the in-group identity questions, n = 24), the condition effect was not significant, Median in-groupwaited = 5.15 min, Median in-group-didn't-wait = 15 min, hazard ratio = .60, X 2 (1)= .74, p > .250, 95% CI = [.19, 1.91] .
Consistent with our second preregistered hypothesis, children in the in-group-waited condition were more likely to prefer new individuals who delayed gratification (M = 74%, SD = 19%) than children in the in-group-didn't-wait condition (M = 53%, SD = 22%), t(85) = 4.66, p < .001 (Figure 1 ). An exploratory analysis indicated that this effect held controlling for children's delay performance, t(84) = 4.13, p < .001. Children's delay performance also independently predicted their preference for new individuals who delayed gratification, t(84) = 3.21, p = .002.
We did not find evidence supporting our third preregistered hypothesis. Children in both conditions tended to prefer their in-group M in-group-waited = 72%, SD in-group-waited = 26%, t(87) = Figure 1 . Children whose in-group waited and out-group did not were more likely to prefer characters who delayed gratification. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. to children who believed their in-group did not delay and their out-group did. Critically, the new individuals were not presented as group members, so if children were simply trying to behave in accord with their group's behavior, they would have had no reason to later prefer others who delayed gratification. Children led to believe that their group delayed gratification may think this is a group value and internalize this value.
Identification with the in-group was not affected by group behavior (i.e., whether or not the group delayed). Perhaps delaying gratification was not a pre-existing norm, or it was but children's in-group identity was robust to negative information about their group. The latter possibility may be more likely, given that in neither condition did children prefer new individuals who did not delay over new individuals who did delay. Thus, children may have adjusted their valuation of delaying gratification based on group behavior, but never to the point of preferring individuals who do not delay, given their pre-existing norms.
General Discussion
We provide the first evidence that group membership and norms influence self-control behavior and evaluations in young children. Young children were more likely to delay gratification and value it when their group delayed and another group did not, compared to the converse. These findings demonstrate an important way in which self-control behavior does not simply reflect self-control ability, but is also influenced by social contextual factors (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Kidd et al., 2013; Lee & Carlson, 2015; Michaelson & Munakata, 2016; Pepper & Nettle, 2017) . More broadly, these findings show that the influence of social groups on children extends beyond the realm of in-group biases, social expectations, and moral behavior (Liberman, Woodward, & Kinzler, 2017; Jordan, et al., 2014) to the domain of self-control.
This work also supports a new perspective on individual differences in self-control behavior in childhood, which predict concurrent and later life outcomes. In addition to variation in relevant cognitive and neural systems, variation in how much self-control is emphasized -in the family, community, or peer group -may influence how much individuals use self-control both in childhood and later in life (see also Lamm et al., in press ). Norms could influence children to work harder to exert control, could support their self-control by allowing them to imagine themselves or their group using self-control, or could lead them to utilize the selfcontrol they have. Moreover, opportunities to practice self-control early in life may shape the neural substrates that support it (Doebel, Michaelson, & Munakata, in press; Diamond & Lee, 2011; Zelazo, 2015) , resulting in reciprocal, cascading effects (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Smith & Thelen, 2003) that make it easier for children to exercise self-control and to improve across the lifespan.
Our findings have implications for interventions to improve self-control in those who struggle with it. Supporting values and norms around self-control may be a fruitful approach to improving self-control in individuals for whom self-control is not a salient or well-established norm or value. For example, interventions to improve self-control could be conducted in a group format and self-control could be promoted as a group value.
Future research can examine such possibilities, in addition to further investigating the ways in which group behavior and norms influence self-control. For example, are children driven to engage self-control by the actions of their in-group, or those of the out-group, or both (given that in-group bias and out-group prejudice are distinct phenomena; Aboud, 2003) Addressing such questions will advance our understanding of how self-control develops and is shaped by sociocultural factors to support adaptive behavior across the lifespan, and will inspire new approaches to improving it.
